Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with an Informal Sector by Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato

Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1168











6-2008OPTIMAL TAX DESIGN AND ENFORCEMENT
WITH AN INFORMAL SECTOR
by
Robin Boadway, Queen’s University, Canada




An optimal commodity tax approach is taken to compare trade taxes and VATs when
some commodities are produced informally. Trade taxes apply to all imports and exports,
i n c l u d i n gi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sw h i l et h eV A Ta p p l i e so n l yt os a l e sb yt h ef o r m a ls e c t o ra n d
imports. The VAT can achieve production eﬃciency within the formal sector, but unlike
the trade tax regime, it cannot indirectly tax pure proﬁts. Making the size of the informal
sector endogenous in each regime is potentially decisive. The ability of the government to
change the size of the informal sector through costly enforcement may also tip the balance
in favor of the VAT.
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The problem of tax design for developing countries remains a vexing one. On the one
hand, Emran and Stiglitz (2005) argue that, given the size of the informal sector in these
countries, the conventional argument for a broad-based tax like the value-added tax (VAT)
may not be valid. Since ﬁrms in the informal sector can avoid paying the VAT, but they
cannot avoid paying taxes imposed on international trade administered at the border,
the latter may be more eﬀective revenue-raising devices. They show in a simple model
that trade taxes can be more eﬃcient than a VAT yielding the same government revenue
despite the fact that trade taxes have a much narrower base. Related to that, Piggott
and Whalley (2001) have shown that expanding the base of a VAT can reduce welfare
in the presence of informality by inducing suppliers of newly taxed goods or services to
move into the untaxed sector. On the other hand, Keen (2008) argues that Emran and
Stiglitz underestimate the extent to which the VAT in developing countries succeeds in
extracting tax revenues from the informal sector. Not only do informal ﬁrms pay the
VAT on purchases from formal ﬁrms and imports (which in the case of imported inputs
accomplishes the same as trade taxes), but also these countries often deploy withholding
taxes that eﬀectively impose a diﬀerential tax on the informal sector. These withholding
taxes can apply on either imported inputs or on domestically produced inputs over and
above the VAT. In either case, the withholding taxes can be credited by taxpaying ﬁrms
against their ordinary tax liabilities, and as such constitute a tax that eﬀectively applies
only to informal ﬁrms.
Both the Emran-Stiglitz and Keen analyses are convincing in the contexts of their
models, but the models themselves are somewhat restrictive. Emran and Stiglitz can ignore
the payment of VAT on the inputs of informal sector ﬁrms simply because intermediate
inputs are missing from the production side of the economy in their model. Indeed, the
ability of the VAT to avoid distortions in production is precisely because of the crediting
method it applies to intermediate inputs, something that is missing in trade tax regimes.
Keen’s results are also somewhat limited since they are derived in a simple setting
chosen for illustrative purposes and to generate analytically tractable results. He assumes
that the informal sector produces a non-traded good that is substitutable for formal sector
1production, and uses imported intermediate inputs along with some untaxed ﬁxed factor.
The formal sector produces the same ﬁnal non-traded product also using an imported
intermediate input, but generates no proﬁts or payments to an underlying ﬁxed factor.
While this generates an elegant model that in some, not unreasonable, circumstances leads
to the result that trade taxes should not be used as long as withholding taxes are available
alongside the VAT, some potentially important factors are missing. The assumption that
the informal sector earns untaxed proﬁts while the formal sector does not could be thought
of as equivalent to assuming that proﬁts in the formal sector can be taxed at 100 percent.
If this is not the case, both the VAT and trade tax regimes would have indirect eﬀects on
untaxed proﬁts that could aﬀect the case for one versus the other. Similarly, restricting
informal sector outputs to be non-traded rules out other avenues of diﬀerence between VAT
and trade tax regimes, given that taxes on imports can also aﬀect the price of importables
produced by the informal sector, while exporters receive a refund of the VAT.
More generally, both Emran-Stiglitz and Keen assume that the number of producers
in the informal sector is given, while allowing informal production to vary according to
tax policies. One might expect that if the tax advantage to informality diﬀers between the
VAT and trade tax regimes, the relative number of informal producers would as well. This
may be especially important if producers are systematically less eﬃcient in the informal
sector than in the formal sector. For example, Gordon and Li (2005) have argued that
because informal producers cannot take full advantage of ﬁnancial intermediation, they
will be less eﬃcient, and de Paula and Scheinkman (2007) argue that informal producers
will be less eﬃcient because they have limited access to capital markets. In addition,
ﬁrms in the informal sector may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to hire skilled workers and may be
constrained to be small in size.
Tax enforcement should also aﬀect the relative size of the informal sector in the econ-
omy as a whole. As noted by Emran and Stiglitz (2005), developing countries are con-
strained by weak tax administration capacities in raising tax revenue, with tax evasion and
corruption being widespread. There is some evidence that tax administration is particu-
larly weak in countries relying on trade taxes. Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) report that
in low-income countries, revenue recovery after decreasing trade taxes is weak, with less
2that 30 percent of lost revenue being recovered by alternative revenue sources. Admittedly,
tax administration is diﬃcult to improve, but it is not something to be taken as given.
Indeed, the introduction of a VAT is often regarded as a step toward the overall modern-
ization of tax administration, adopting self-assessment, a function-based administrative
organization, and an eﬀective audit program, which can subsequently extended to income
taxation. Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) argue that tax enforcement should be a part of
the ‘optimal taxation’ problem, along with the tax rate and base structure, since it aﬀects
the elasticities of tax bases.
Our purpose in this paper is to construct a general model of optimal tax design in an
economy with an informal sector. Our model encompasses the following features. Firms
in both the formal and the informal sector produce goods that are tradable and that
can use both importable or exportable intermediate inputs. The products produced by
the two sectors can be diﬀerent. The government can levy either trade taxes or VAT-
type commodity taxes. In both cases, tax rates can diﬀer across commodities and can be
optimized. In the VAT regime, formal producers receive input tax credits when they use
taxed commodities as inputs, whereas informal producers do not. This implies that the
VAT on intermediates (as opposed to on ﬁnal goods) allows the government to tax the
informal sector indirectly when it uses inputs that have been taxed. In addition, all ﬁrms
earn pure proﬁts that cannot be fully taxed. Indeed, they may be untaxed, which, though
extreme, is a useful benchmark to take for developing countries whose income tax systems
are of limited scope. Firms are allowed to have diﬀerent production functions according
to whether they participate in the formal or informal sectors. While in our base case we
assume, as in Emran-Stiglitz and Keen, that the scope of the informal sector is given, we
also investigate the consequences of producers freely choosing their sector of production
in each tax regime, and we allow the government to aﬀect that at some administrative
cost. As in these papers, we also assume that the household sector can be represented by
a representative consumer so that all our analysis is based on eﬃciency considerations.1
1 An alternative approach is taken by Munk (2005), who models the informal sector as a form
of household production. Informal producers purchase inputs from the formal sector and apply
some of their own labor to produce output informally. Their output is kept within the informal
3Our basic approach is to make global comparisons between a full VAT regime and a
full trade tax regime rather than, say, deriving conditions for the optimal mix of commodity
and trade taxes. This is obviously an ambitious task that generally leads to ambiguous
results. Our purpose is to identify the considerations that tend to favor one regime over
the other. To facilitate our analysis, we assume, following Emran and Stiglitz (2005), that
all commodities are traded and that the economy is a small open one. This implies that
world prices are ﬁxed and that domestic taxes have a one-for-one eﬀect on producer and
consumer prices as the case may be. While this simpliﬁes the analysis greatly, it does so at
the expense of assuming away non-traded commodities in either sector. This assumption
should not bias the case in favor of either trade taxes or the VAT since neither of them
will apply to non-traded goods sold by the informal sector.
We begin with the case where the scope of the formal and the informal sectors is ﬁxed,
that is, where the producers in each are given. We derive conditions under which a fully
diﬀerential VAT is more eﬃcient than trade taxes. When there is no formal sector, the
latter will be unambiguously preferred, but when there is a formal sector, the comparison
is ambiguous, even if there is no informal sector. We then investigate the eﬀect of changes
in the size of the informal sector. First, we consider the eﬀect on welfare of moving a
producer from the informal to the formal sector. Then, producers are allowed to freely
choose their sector in each tax regime. Finally, we let the government inﬂuence the size of
the informal sector by increasing the resources devoted to administering the tax system.
2 Basic Setting
Consider a small open economy with J +1 tradable commodities denoted by j =0 ,···,J.
Denote by X and M the sets of exportable and importable goods, respectively, and let
A = X∪M be the set of all goods. Each good j is produced by a representative producer,
identiﬁed as producer j, who can operate in the formal sector (F) or the informal (shadow)
sector (S). Let {XF,XS} and {MF,MS} be the sets of exportables and importables in
the two sectors, and deﬁne the sets of goods produced in the two sectors as F ≡ XF ∪MF
sector. This model seems particularly appropriate to subsistence farming, whereas our focus is
on producers who purchase and sell commodities to the market economy.
4and S ≡ XS ∪ MS. The sizes and compositions of F and S are initially taken as given.
Consumer prices are denoted q = {q0,q 1,···,q j,···,q J},w h i l et h ep r i c e sf a c e db y









J}. Where necessary, we shall
refer to producer prices for the entire economy by the extended vector of producer prices
in the two sectors: p ≡ (pF,pS).2 World prices are normalized to be unity for all J +1
commodities. Assume that commodity j = 0 is untaxed and tradable, so that q0 = p0 =
1.3 There are two main types of indirect taxes: international trade taxes denoted t =
{t1,···,t j,···,t J} and a destination-based value-added tax (VAT) based on consumption
with rates v = {v1,···,v j,···,v J} that can vary across commodities. Both types of taxes
on transactions can be interpreted as either per unit taxes or ad valorem taxes based
on world prices. For importables (j ∈ M), an import tax implies tj > 0, whereas for
exportables (j ∈ X), an export tax means tj < 0 by convention (since the tax bases are
deﬁned below to be net imports, which are negative for exportables). Trade taxes apply
to all commodities whether produced in the formal or informal sector: they cannot be
evaded. The VAT is paid on domestic sales by the formal sector as well as on imports.
Producers in the informal sector avoid charging the VAT on goods they sell, including
those for domestic consumption purposes. But, they must pay taxes on commodities
purchased from the formal sector or imported, and they cannot claim a VAT rebate. This
characterization of the informal sector in which producers must choose to be either in
the formal or the informal sector is a simpliﬁcation. In practice, informality may be less
2 Since producers purchase inputs from other producers, one might think that producer prices are
ambiguous in an economy in which transactions are taxed. However, in our setting, domestic
producers face the same price for a commodity whether they are buyers or sellers. In the case of
the VAT, taxes levied on the purchase of inputs are credited, so the buyer and seller eﬀectively
face the same price. With trade taxes, no tax applies on sales within the domestic economy.
Therefore, the notion of producer prices is not ambiguous.
3 Clearly, it is arbitrary to assume that one of the traded commodities is untaxed. If not, uniform
commodity taxation could be levied, which would be non-distortionary in the absence of an
informal sector and would amount to a tax on pure proﬁts. Our analysis would not be very
interesting in this case. A more natural assumption would be that commodity zero is leisure, as
in the optimal tax literature. This would complicate our analysis somewhat (since the relative
price of leisure would be variable) without adding any additional insight. No results of substance
are lost by assuming there is an untaxed tradable commodity, as in Emran and Stiglitz (2005).
5clearcut and may include tax evasion. For example, producers in the formal sector who
are registered in the VAT system may receive tax credits on their inputs while at the same
time failing to pay all taxes on their ﬁnal sales. We ignore this form of tax evasion in what
follows.
We assume that income is not fully taxed either in the hands of producers or house-
holds, and this is important for our analysis. In our model, income takes the form of
proﬁts generated by producers. The source of these proﬁts is not modeled explicitly, but
presumably they could come from some ﬁxed factor, such as labor. Let θ b et h er a t eo f
tax on proﬁts, applicable only in the formal sector, where 0  θ<1. As we shall see,
the comparison between the VAT and trade tax regimes is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the
inability to tax formal sector proﬁts fully. The reason is that while the VAT taxes proﬁts
in the informal sector by imposing a non-refundable tax on inputs purchased from the
formal sector, it does not tax proﬁts in the formal sector. That is, formal sector producer
prices under a VAT regime remain world prices, so pure proﬁts are not aﬀected. The VAT
is ultimately fully paid by domestic consumers. On the other hand, trade taxes tax proﬁts
in both sectors to the extent that traded commodities are used as inputs since producer
prices are increased by the full amount of trade taxes. If proﬁts could be taxed fully, this
advantage of trade taxes would no longer apply and the balance would tip in favor of the
VAT, as argued by Keen (2008). Thus, the assumption that θ<1 is an important one.4
Note also that all commodities are assumed to be tradable (except any ﬁxed factors
that are responsible for generating rents in production). Non-traded goods could be added
to the model but with the added complexity that their producer prices would have to be
determined endogenously. Keen (2008) does assume that the output of the informal sector
is non-traded, but his model is otherwise very simpliﬁed by focusing on that sector alone.
To the extent that the non-traded sector is more important for informal producers, this
would reduce the advantage that trade taxes have in reaching the informal sector.5
4 Gordon and Li (2005) and Auriol and Warlters (2005) also argue that seemingly ineﬃcient
revenue instruments like capital taxes, trade protection or fees on entry have the advantage of
taxing rents in the formal sector, unlike the VAT.
5 Emran and Stiglitz (2005) argue that trade taxes are not put at a disadvantage relative to the
VAT when there is a non-traded sector. That is because the VAT cannot tax the informal
6These assumptions imply that consumer prices are given by q = 1 + t in the trade
tax regime and q = 1 + v in the VAT regime. Producer prices in the formal sector are
pF = q = 1 + t in the trade tax regime and pF = 1 (i.e., world prices) in the VAT
regime. In the informal sector, prices are somewhat more complicated. In the trade tax
regime, pS = q = 1 + t as in the formal sector. In the VAT regime, prices facing the
informal sector depend on whether the good is exportable or importable, and on whether
the good is a ﬁnal one or an intermediate one. In the case of exportables (j ∈ XS), no
VAT is collected, so vj = 0 and pS
j = 1. Thus, exportables produced in the informal
sector might be purchased by formal producers. Since no tax is paid, producers would
receive no input tax credit so the price would fall to the world price. Of course, if they
purchase inputs from the formal sector, a VAT is paid and a credit is recovered. On the
other hand, informal producers would have to pay tax-inclusive prices on their inputs, but
cannot get a tax credit. In these circumstances, producers of exportables would likely opt
for the formal sector. When we later allow producers to choose in which sector to produce,
it will be the case that XS = ∅ in the VAT regime. For importables produced in the
informal sector (j ∈ MS), if these can be sold as ﬁnal consumer goods, the price received
by informal ﬁrms is pS
j =1+vj since consumers are indiﬀerent between purchasing a good
at a given price from the informal and as imports. On the other hand, formal producers
would not purchase intermediate importable inputs from the informal sector because they
would obtain no input tax credit.
All producers act as price-takers and maximize their proﬁts. Each produces a single
output using a vector of inputs, where the latter can come from the formal or the informal
sector. For producer j, proﬁt maximization yields the proﬁt function RjF(pF)o rRjS(pS)
depending on whether production is in the formal or informal sector. Production in the
informal sector may be less eﬃcient because informal producers have limited access to the
banking system (Gordon and Li, 2005), capital markets (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2007),
the legal system or public infrastructure, and this aﬀects their relative proﬁtabilities. Let
αj  1 represent the exogenously given advantage of producing in the formal sector. Then,
non-traded sector indirectly in their model since there are no intermediate inputs and the VAT
does not apply to imports in the informal sector.
7we can write proﬁts in the two sectors as:
RjF(pF)=αjrj(pF),R jS(pS)=rj(pS)( 1 )
where rj(·) is a common underlying proﬁtability.6 Aggregate proﬁts (before income tax)
a r et h e nd e ﬁ n e da sf o l l o w s :







Using the envelope theorem, the output of producer j in sector F is denoted by RjF
pj ≡
∂RjF/∂pF
j > 0, and inputs of commodity k used by producer j by RjF
pk ≡ ∂RjF/∂pF
k  0.
Similarly, for sector S, the output of producer j is RjS
pj ≡ ∂RjS/∂pS
j > 0, and inputs of k
are RjS
pk ≡ ∂RjS/∂pS
k  0. Note that all proﬁt functions are homogeneous of degree one in









All consumers are identical so we can normalize population to unity and characterize
the household sector by the representative consumer. The consumer’s income comes from
the proﬁts of producers in both sectors: thus, we make no distinction between owners of
formal and informal ﬁrms. Given that proﬁts in the formal sector are taxed at the rate
θ, after-tax consumer income is R − θRF. Given this income, the consumer chooses ﬁnal
consumption to maximize utility given the relevant consumer prices in the two sectors. It
is convenient to characterize the maximized outcome by the expenditure function E(q,u),
where q is the vector of consumer prices and u is utility. By Hotelling’s lemma, com-
pensated demands for all J + 1 commodities are given by Eqj ≡ ∂E(q,u)/∂qj,a n dt h e
consumer’s budget constraint may be written:
E(q,u)=R − θRF (3)
E(q,u) is homogeneous of degree one in all J +1p r i c e s ,s oE(q,u)=
 
j∈A qjEqj.
6 One could argue that for small producers, the costs of complying with tax and other regulations
might outweigh the advantages of participating in the formal economy, leading to αj < 1. We
could allow for such producers without aﬀecting our results. Some ﬁrms with αj suﬃciently low
may also fall below the VAT threshold if the value of revenues generated is not enough to oﬀset
the compliance costs, as analyzed in Keen and Mintz (2004). These ﬁrms would be indistinct
from those in the informal sector.
8The consumer’s budget constraint can be rewritten by substituting (2) into (3) and


















pk − θRF (4)
In the general case, where both trade taxes and the VAT may be in place, we have qj =
1+vj+tj and pF
j =1+tj in the formal sector. In the informal sector, pS
j = qj =1+tj+vj















pj and Rpj is the net output of j, given using (2) by:








pj (1 + t + v)( 6 )
The term
 
j tj(Eqj −Rpj) in (5) is the revenue from trade taxes levied on the net imports
of each commodity. (Recall that for exports, tj < 0a n dEqj − Rpj < 0.) The term
 
j vj(Eqj−RS
pj) is the VAT revenue obtained from the ﬁnal value of domestic consumption
of each commodity less the net domestic production of the commodity in the informal
sector, where vj =0f o rj ∈ XS, so no tax revenue is obtained on ﬁnal consumption of
exportables produced in the informal sector.7
Tax revenue is used for some exogenously given public expenditures, denoted G.T h e







pj)+θRF = G (7)
7 We assume that Eqn >R S
pn for all importables n. This implies that for j ∈ MS, producers
transact using consumer prices, so pS
j = qj =1+vj. If the importable is a pure intermediate
good, the price received by informal producers will be bid down to the world price by demand
from the formal sector. Such producers will likely opt for the formal sector since there is no
advantage from operating informally. More generally, if Eqn <R S
pn the price of good n in the
informal sector will be bid down below 1 + vn, which complicates the analysis without adding
additional insight.
93 Optimal Taxes in the Basic Model
The government chooses its tax rates to maximize the representative household’s utility
subject to its revenue constraint (7) and the consumer’s budget constraint (5). (Note that
combining (5) and (7) yields the economy’s resource constraint so it is not necessary to
take explicit account of the latter. In the general case where both trade taxes and VAT
exist, the Lagrangian may be written:












(Rpj − Eqj) −
 
j






The Lagrange multiplier λ can be interpreted as the social value of an increment of revenues
raised using the distorting tax system, while μ is the social value of an increment of
resources available to the nation (and owned by the household). As is well-known from
optimal tax theory, λ>μas long as positive tax revenues are being raised (Auerbach and














where, recall, Rpj is the net domestic output of commodity j produced in both sectors of
the economy and Eqj is its compensated domestic demand. The choice variables are u, t
and v, but we can focus on the latter two in what follows. To compare trade taxes and
the VAT in the presence of the informal sector, we consider the two regimes separately.
The Tr ade Tax Regi me
In this case v = 0, so the Lagrangian expression under trade taxes, denoted Lt,c a nb e
written using (8) as::








(Rpj − Eqj) − λG (9)
where p = 1 + t is the vector of producer prices, which is the same in the formal and
informal sectors with only trade taxes in eﬀect. The government can diﬀerentiate all trade
10taxes, so its ﬁrst-order condition on tn c a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s :
(λ − μ)
 






tj(Eqjqn − Rpjpn) ∀n>0 (10)






j(1 + tj)Rpjpn = 0 and
 
j(1 + tj)Eqjqn =0 .
These optimal trade tax conditions have a straightforward and familiar interpretation.
The lefthand side is the gain in tax revenue from an incremental increase in tn weighted
by the social value of a transfer of revenues from the private to the public sector, λ −
μ. The righthand side is the marginal deadweight loss from the change in compensated
demands, Eqjqn, and from the change in producer demands, Rpjpn, given that tariﬀs distort
both consumption and production choices. Notice that if θ = 0, (10) gives a standard
proportionate reduction rule in net imports.
These conditions along with the constraints and the ﬁrst-order condition on u can be
solved to yield the optimal trade tax rates in the trade tax regime (regime T) denoted tT
(with tT
0 = 0 for the untaxed good), the shadow prices λT and μT,w i t hλT >μ T,a n dt h e







RjST(1 + tT) (11)
Also, we denote the value of Lt when trade taxes are optimized as LT
t ,w h e r eb y( 9 ) :
LT












qj) − λTG (12)
The VAT Regi me
In this case, t = 0, v0 = 0 and vk =0f o rk ∈ XS. The analog of (9) derived from (8) is:
Lv = u +( λ − μ)








(Rpj − Eqj) − λG (13)
8 We assume the solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions is interior and unique. It is well-known that
there is no guarantee that the second-order conditions will be satisﬁed in optimal tax problems,
and this is particularly important in our context since we are investigating perturbations from
an optimum.






pj(1 + v). The ﬁrst-order condition on vn c a nb ew r i t t e na s :





pjpn) ∀n  ∈ XS (14)
where we have again used the homogeneity properties of the proﬁt and expenditure func-






Again, the interpretation of (14) is straightforward. The lefthand side is the social
v a l u eo ft h en e tg a i ni nr e v e n u e sf r o ma ni n c r e a s ei nvn, while the righthand side is the
marginal deadweight loss created by dvn. Relative to (10), (14) reﬂects the fact that the
VAT does not collect any tax on rents in the formal sector, but at the same time it does
not distort production there. Note that in the absence of an informal sector, the terms
involving RS disappear and (14) is just the standard Ramsey optimal tax rule.
The solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions on vn and u in the VAT regime (regime
V ) along with the constraints yields the optimal commodity tax rates {vV
j }j ∈XS (with
vV







RiSV (1 + vV )
where qV = 1 + vV ,w i t hvV
j =0f o rj ∈ XS. The value of the Lagrangian (13) when the
VAT is optimized is:
LV
v = uV +(λV −μV )












Note that in the two regimes, the optimal values of uT and uV depend upon the
number of producers the formal sector, F = XF ∪ MF. The key diﬀerences between the
two regimes are that i) production eﬃciency is maintained in the formal sector in the VAT
regime but not the trade tax regime, and ii) proﬁts in the formal sector are indirectly taxed
in the trade tax regime but not in the VAT regime, since producer prices in the formal
sector remain unaﬀected by the VAT. The ﬁrst diﬀerence favors the VAT, while the second
favors trade taxes. Depending on the strength of these eﬀects, either could be preferred.9
9 Newbery (1986) shows that if rents cannot be fully taxed and commodity taxes are diﬀerentiable,
it may be optimal to violate production eﬃciency by taxing intermediate inputs.
12Before turning to a comparison between the two regimes, recall that Keen (2008)
allows for a withholding tax in his VAT regime, which in his context is important for
arguing in favor of the VAT. In our context, the possibility of varying the VAT rates by
commodity implicitly allows for the analog of the withholding tax. To see this, consider
commodities j ∈ F and i ∈ S with qj =1+vj and qi = pS
i =1+vi,w h e r evi =0f o r
i ∈ XS. Suppose producers of j and i use an importable commodity k as an input, so
vk is charged as a tax. Then, vk may interpreted as a withholding tax as in Keen. With
qk =1+vk, vk is borne by the informal producers of i, while the formal producers of j
can claim a credit.
4 Comparing Regimes Given the Informal Sector Size
In this section, the number and composition of producers in the formal and informal
sectors (F and S) are taken as given and the same in both regimes, despite the fact that
each regime provides ﬁrms with diﬀering incentives to opt for sector S. Later, we allow for
endogenous choice of sector size, in which case both the size and composition of the informal
sector will diﬀer in the two regimes. We compare household utilities uT and uV generated
under the two regimes, given revenue requirements G, and characterize the circumstances
under which one regime will be preferred to the other. We begin with a comparison in
the general case in which both formal and informal sectors of given composition exist and
there are no constraints on taxes. We then discuss special cases of this general result when
the size of one of the sectors is restricted or when policies are limited.
Suppose then that there are both formal and informal sectors, that is, F  = ∅, S  = ∅.
We want to compare utility obtained in the trade tax regime, uT,w i t ht h a ti nt h eV A T
regime, uV . Recall that in the VAT regime, since no VAT is charged on exports, informal
ﬁrms in the exportable sector receive no protection from the VAT, so vj =0f o rj ∈ XS.
To facilitate comparison between the two regimes, it is useful to consider the trade tax
regime when we artiﬁcially impose the comparable restriction that tj =0f o rj ∈ XS.
Let tC be the value of optimal trade taxes in this constrained regime, which yields the
utility level uC and proﬁts RC. Deﬁne the diﬀerence in utilities between the unrestricted
and restricted trade tax regimes as ΔuT ≡ uT − uC  0, with the equality applying when
13XS = 0. Finally, let LC
v be the value of the Lagrange expression in the VAT regime when
tax rates satisfy v = tC with μ = μV and λ = λV . (This will involve some negative VAT
rates if tj < 0f o rj ∈ XF.) Using these deﬁnitions, the following proposition is proven in
the Appendix.











v > (λV − μV )(1 − θ)(RFV − RFC)+ΔuT (16)
The various terms in expression (16) reﬂect the relative advantages of each regime. In
the ﬁrst term on the lefthand side, RFV −
 
j RFC
pj gives the gain in production eﬃciency
in the formal sector under the VAT. That is, RFV is the value of maximized proﬁts under
the VAT where producer prices are world prices (pT = 1), while
 
j RFC
pj is the value
of proﬁts in the trade tax regime when the world prices are used to evaluate inputs and
outputs. Naturally, this term will be positive. The ﬁrst term on the righthand side involves
the diﬀerence in formal sector proﬁts in the two regimes (with the restriction that tj =0
for j ∈ XS). The term (1 − θ)(RFV − RFC) is the increase in after-tax rent accruing to
the household from substituting a VAT for trade taxes. It reﬂects the opportunity cost of
the government failing to extract the rent. The sign of this term is generally ambiguous
without further assumption: proﬁts can be higher in either regime in general. However,
to the extent that the trade tax regime indirectly taxes rents in the formal sector, RFC
will be lower and that will favor trade taxes. The ﬁnal term on the righthand side, ΔuT,
is positive as mentioned and reﬂects the fact that the VAT cannot be charged on informal
exportables. Finally, the term LV
v −L C
v is necessarily positive.
In general, which regime is preferable depends on the relative size of these various
terms. However, there are a number of special cases of interest that we can deduce from
this general case. First, consider the case where there are no informal exportables, so
XS = ∅. This case is of interest because, as we shall see, when producers are free to
choose their sector of operation, producers of exportables would not choose the informal
sector in the VAT regime because the price at which they sell their output is the world
price, whereas they have to pay tax-inclusive prices on their inputs and cannot obtain a
14credit if they operate informally. In this case, we have t = tC, which implies that ΔuT =0 .
Then, since LV
v > LC
v , the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1: uV >u T when XS = ∅ and θ =1 .
A similar consequence arises if, instead of assuming there is no informal exportable
sector, we assume that trade taxes only apply to importables, so tj =0f o rj ∈ X.I nt h i s
case, we have again that t = tC,s oΔuT = 0 and RFV −
 
j RFC
pj > 0. This leads to the
following corollary.
Corollary 2: uV >u T when tj =0for j ∈ X and either θ =1or RFC >R FV.
On the other hand, there are some inﬂuences tending to favor the trade tax regime. As
(16) indicates, lower values of θ tend to favor the trade tax regime, given that trade taxes
indirectly tax proﬁts in the formal sector. A larger informal sector might also favor trade
taxes since it reduces the value of achieving production eﬃciency in the formal sector.10
Next, consider the case where there is no informal sector, so S = ∅ and F = A.
Recall that under trade taxation, producer and consumer prices in the formal sector are
pF = q = 1+t, while in the VAT regime, we have pF = 1 and q = 1+v. Here that applies
to the entire economy. Proﬁts under optimal taxation in the trade and VAT regimes in this
case are RT =
 
j(1+tT
j )Rpj(1+tT)a n dRV =
 
j Rpj(1) by the homogeneity property
of the proﬁt function, where Rpj =
 
i Ri
pj. The next corollary follows immediately from
Proposition 1 and indicates a suﬃcient condition for the VAT regime to be preferable to
the trade tax regime:







λV (1 − θ)(RV − RT) (17)
10 The above results can be generalized to any case in which VAT rates are more constrained
than trade taxes. Thus, suppose the set of feasible VAT rates, say Ωv, is more restricted that
the set of feasible trade tax rates, Ωt,s oΩv ⊂ Ωt.F o re x a m p l e ,t h eV A Tm a yb er e s t r i c t e d
to be uniform or non-negative, or subject to limited diﬀerentiation for administrative or other
reasons. Then, uC can be interpreted as maximized utility when the restriction t ⊂ Ωt is
imposed, and ΔuT = uT − uC is the loss in utility arising from the restriction in tax rates.
Proposition 1 applies with this reinterpretation of ΔuT.
15The intuition for this result is as follows. Note ﬁrst that using optimal tax conditions































where εnj is the compensated elasticity of demand for good n with respect to the price of
good j.T h er a t i oλV /μV can be interpreted as the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF)
in the VAT regime. It is the social cost of transferring an increment of revenue from the






which is the increase in the marginal excess burden associated with a transfer of funds from
the household to the government. Thus, the righthand side of (17) is the increase in after-
tax rent accruing to the household from substituting a VAT for trade taxes, (1−θ)(RV −
RT), weighted by (MCPF−1)/MCPF. The sign of RV −RT is generally ambiguous without
further assumptions, though it will be larger the greater is the extent to which trade
taxes indirectly tax proﬁts. The lefthand side is the gain from removing the production
ineﬃciency caused by trade taxation, which is positive.
Inspection of (17) conﬁrms that uV >u T if RV  RT or θ =1 . 11 That is, in the
absence of an informal sector, the VAT will be preferred to trade taxes if proﬁts are fully
taxed or proﬁts are higher under trade taxes. Keen and Ligthart (2002) consider the case
where S = ∅ and θ = 0, and ﬁnd that the VAT regime is preferred in their basic model.
This is a consequence of their base-case assumption that there are no intermediate inputs,
so Rpj > 0 for all commodities, which implies that RV = R(1) <R (1 + tT)=RT.T h i s
gives uV >u T by Corollary 1. They also assume that trade taxes are imposed only on
imports, and this reduces the attractiveness of the trade tax regime. This unambiguous
11 If proﬁts are taxed at 100 percent, the consumers will need some source of revenues to
purchase goods. This can be accommodated by supposing that good zero is an input supplied
by consumers so Eq0 < 0.
16preference for the VAT vanishes in our context since with intermediate goods, some of
which may be net imports, we can have Rpj < 0 for some goods. (Keen and Ligthart
subsequently extend their analysis to allow for intermediate inputs.) More generally, (17)
suggests that the VAT will be preferred if θ is above some cutoﬀ level.
Finally, consider the opposite case where there is no formal sector. In this obviously
extreme case, all activities take place in the informal sector. Trade taxes t apply to all
commodities, while the VAT v applies only to imported commodities, so vj =0f o rj ∈ X.
Thus, the VAT is more restrictive. With F = ∅, Proposition 1 implies:
Corollary 4: With F = ∅, uT >u V .
Intuitively, the trade tax regime can replicate the VAT regime, which applies only to
imports, since domestic ﬁrms are all untaxed. Starting with the case where trade taxes
replicate the VAT, trade taxes can be further optimized since exports can now be taxed.
5 Changes in the Size of the Informal Sector
The above analysis assumed that the allocation of ﬁrms to the formal and informal sectors
was exogenous. Here, we consider the eﬀects of changes in S and F. We begin by con-
sidering the eﬀects of moving one producer from the informal to the formal sector in each
tax regime. This will establish some preliminary results that will be useful in the following
section where we allow producer to choose sectors in each regime.
The Tr ade Tax Regi me
Given F and S,w ec a nw r i t et h em a x i m i z e du t i l i t yo ft h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e ri nt h e
trade tax regime as simply the maximized value of the Lagrangian in (12), or uT = LT
t .
Suppose now that the representative producer of commodity n moves from sector S to
sector F.G i v e nF, tT is optimal and the envelope theorem applies, so using (12) we have:
ΔuT

















pj +( λT − μT)θΔRFT (18)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dΔRT
pj =( αn − 1)rnT





17To interpret this, note that producers face the same prices pT = 1 + tT in both the
formal and informal sectors. The move of the representative producer of n will therefore
simply expand inputs and outputs by (αn−1) without improving production eﬃciency. The
ﬁrst term in (18) is the increase in rent accruing to the representative household due to the
e x p a n s i o no fp r o d u c t i o no fc o m m o d i t yn by αn − 1. The second term involves the change
in tariﬀ revenue, which can be of either sign. If commodity n is importable (n ∈ M), an
increase in the domestic output of n by (αn − 1)rnT
pn lowers imports and decreases tariﬀ
revenue, whereas increasing inputs to produce n, −(αn − 1)rnT
pj > 0( j  = n), enhances
government revenue when tT
j > 0. In the case where n ∈ X, both the increase in domestic
output and the increased need for inputs tend to increase trade tax revenue. The third
term is the net social value of transferring proﬁts from the household to the government
since the proﬁts of commodity n are now taxed. In general ΔuT
n > < 0, given αn > 1, but
for αn = 1 the following lemma is immediate and will be useful in what follows.
Lemma 1: If αn =1 , ΔuT
n  0 as θ  0.
The intuition for this is clear. Given that αn = 1, there is no change in output when
a producer moves from the informal to the formal sector. However, the proﬁts of the
producer now become subject to taxation and these have a net social value of λT −μT per
unit of tax revenue.
Lemma 1 has the following implication. Let |F| denote the number of commodities
produced in the formal sector. Figure 1(a) depicts how per capita utility in the trade
tax regime varies with the number of commodities in the formal sector in the range of
producers for which αj = 1, assuming that at each point on the curve the government
is optimizing trade taxes. The presumption in this ﬁgure is that ﬁrms that are more
productive in the formal sector have already moved, a presumption that will apply in the
next section. When θ =0 ,uT remains unchanged as more producers with αj =1m o v et o
sector F.
The VAT Regi me
In this case, given F and S, the maximized utility of the representative consumer is the
value of the maximized Lagrangian in (15), or uV = LV
t . Consider again a move of
18producers of commodity n from S to F. This case is more complicated than the trade
tax case because, as we have seen, the relevant producer may face a diﬀerent tax rate
in the two sectors. In particular, if the commodity is exportable, producers will bear no
tax in the informal sector and this would have to be be taken into account in considering
the consequences of a producer moving from one sector to another. In fact, our interest
in the following section is limited to the case where only importables are produced in
the informal sector in the VAT regime since, when producers are free to choose, those
producing exportables will always opt for the formal sector (in order to take advantage
of input tax crediting). We therefore focus here on the case where commodity n is an
importable. Applying the envelope theorem to (15), we obtain the following:
ΔuV


































pj(1 + vV ) > 0 (20)
The ﬁrst term on the righthand side of (20) is just (αn−1)rn(1) by the homogeneity of the
proﬁt function. The latter two terms represent the change in the value of aggregate net
proﬁts by producers of commodity n evaluated at world prices. Thus, (20) indicates that
the reallocation of the producer of commodity n from the informal to the formal sector
improves production eﬃciency and, if αn > 1, expands output.
Since the sign of the last term in (19) is positive, the sign of ΔuV





pj . This is the additional net revenue that the VAT can raise from
producers of commodity n,g i v e nt h a tn is importable. Since ΔRSV
pj = −RnSV
pj ,w h e nt h e






























pj > 0, if rn(1+vV )  rn(1) (21)
19Thus, we have:
Lemma 2: If producer n ∈ M moves from S to F, ΔuV
n  0 if rn(1 + vV )  rn(1).
As we shall see below, when producers are free to choose their sector, the condition rn(1+
vV )  rn(1) will necessarily apply for ﬁrms moving since it will apply for all ﬁrms who
choose to operate in the informal sector. Figure 1(b) depicts the eﬀect of moving producers
of importables from the informal to the formal sector, assuming this condition applies,
where again the horizontal axis indicates simply the number of commodities produced
in the formal sector. Note that Lemma 1 applies for any value of the proﬁt tax rate θ.
However, a higher value of θ implies a larger value of ΔuV
n , and therefore a steeper curve
in Figure 1(b).
Lemmas 1 and 2, and their representation in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), will be useful in
the following section when we allow ﬁrms to choose whether to produce in the formal or
informal sector. Note that, while the horizontal axes in these ﬁgures measure the number of
commodities produced in the formal sector in the trade tax and VAT regimes, the identity
of the commodities will generally not be the same in the two regimes, as we shall see.
6 Endogenous Choice of Sector
In comparing the two regimes in Proposition 1 and its corollaries, we assumed that the
same producers are in the informal sector in both regimes. Suppose, following de Paula
and Scheinkman (2007), that producers of each commodity can choose between the formal
and the informal sector in each tax regime. Both the size of the informal sector and its
composition can now diﬀer between the two regimes since each oﬀers diﬀerent advantages
to diﬀerent producers, depending among other things on the size of their productivity
parameter αj, the rate of proﬁt tax in the formal sector θ, and how taxes aﬀect their
proﬁts. To simplify the exposition, we assume initially in this section that proﬁts in the
formal sector are not taxed (θ = 0). This is not an innocuous assumption since, although
t h et a x a t i o no fp r o ﬁ t si st h es a m ei nb o t hr e g i m e s ,t h es i z eo ft h ei n f o r m a ls e c t o ri nt h e
two regimes will diﬀer so diﬀerent amounts of proﬁt tax revenues will be generated in each.
We return to the consequences of θ being positive below.
The representative producer of commodity j will choose between the formal and in-
20formal sectors by comparing proﬁts in each regime.12 Producer j will prefer the formal
sector iﬀ RjF >R jS.I fRjF = RjS, we arbitrarily assume that the producer stays in the
informal sector. This is equivalent to assuming that the default option for producers is to
be in the informal sector. The rationale is that there may be additional costs of partici-
pating in the formal sector that are not captured in rj(·), such as auditing, bookkeeping,
regulations, and so on that we have not formulated explicitly. For example, we could have
allowed there to be a small ﬁxed cost associated with joining the formal sector. Consider
t h et w or e g i m e si nt u r n .
The Tr ade Tax Regi me
In this case, producers face the same producer prices in both sectors, which in the optimum
are given by pT = 1+tT. The condition for producer j to join the formal sector, RjFT >
RjST, becomes αjrj(1 + tT) >r j(1 + tT), or αj > 1. Intuitively, since producers face
the same taxes in the formal and the informal sector under trade taxes, they will join the
formal sector only if they are more productive there.
More formally, deﬁne the set of producers who opt for the formal sector as F 0
t ≡{ j ∈
A|αj > 1}. Then, all j ∈ F 0
t voluntarily participate in the formal sector, so that the set
of ﬁrms in the formal sector under trade taxes is F = F 0
t . Analogous to above, let |F 0
t |
be the size of the formal sector (i.e., number of commodities produced there).
The VAT Regi me
The choice of sector by ﬁrms is more complicated in the VAT case because, besides ﬁrms
possibly having diﬀerent productivities in the two sectors, they may also face diﬀerent tax
rates for both their inputs and outputs. Suppose that in the optimum, all tax rates are
non-negative, so vV  0.
Consider ﬁrst producers of exportables. For j ∈ XS, vV
j = 0 as we have seen. A
producer j ∈ X who opts for the informal sector will pay a tax-inclusive price on inputs
purchased from those in sectors other that XS. This implies, as mentioned earlier, that
12 Recall that all producers of a given commodity are identical so they will all choose the same
sector. This is obviously a simpliﬁcation used for tractability. In the real world, a given
commodity may be produced in both sectors. Moreover, a given producer may be only partly
in the informal sector, for example, if some but not all taxes are evaded.
21for this producer RjSV = rj(1 + vV ) <r j(1)  RjFV.P r o d u c e rj will choose the formal
sector to obtain an input tax credit. Thus, if we assume that all producers in X will use
some inputs that have been taxed, XS = ∅ under the VAT regime. In what follows, we
assume that to be the case.
Producer j of an importable good will operate in the formal sector if and only if
RjFV = αjrj(1) >r j(1 + vV )=RjSV. Since producers of importables operating in the
informal sector obtain consumer prices qV
j =1 + vV
j on their sales, it may be more proﬁtable
to be in the informal sector than in the formal sector even if αj > 1. The set of producers
who prefer the formal sector can be deﬁned as F 0
v ≡{ j ∈ A|αjrjF(1) >r jS(1 + vV )},
and |F 0
v | will be the size of the formal sector in the VAT regime.13
The following lemma summarizes the size of the formal sector in each regime.
Lemma 3:
i. In the trade tax regime, F = F 0
t ≡{ j ∈ A|αj > 1}.
ii. In the VAT regime, X ⊆ F 0
v = F,w h e r eF 0
v ≡{ j ∈ A|αjrjF(1) >r jS(1 + vV )}.
The sets of ﬁrms that join the formal and informal sectors in the two regimes will generally
be overlapping. In the trade tax regime, all ﬁrms with αj > 1 will join the formal sector,
while those with αj = 1 will not. With the VAT, some ﬁrms with αj = 1 will join the
formal sector, while some with αj > 1 will not. Moreover, the relative size of the two
r e g i m e si sa m b i g u o u s :w ec a nh a v ee i t h e r|F 0
v | > |F 0
t | or |F 0
t | > |F 0
v |. Below, we consider
each case in turn.
To facilitate welfare comparisons in the two regimes, consider the thought experiment
of starting with the formal sector existing in each regime, F 0
t and F 0
v , and moving producers
from the informal sector to the formal sector. The following proposition applies.
Proposition 2: Assuming θ =0 ,
i. In the trade tax regime, uT is constant when F is expanded beyond |F 0
t |.
ii. In the VAT regime, uV will rise when F is expanded beyond |F 0
v |.
13 In the formal sector in equilibrium F 0
v depends on vV ,b u ta tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ec h o i c eo fvV
will based on F 0
v . In principle, optimal tax rates vV should be chosen taking into account how
F 0
v is aﬀected by v. For simplicity, we do not take this interdependency into account in deriving
our optimal tax rates and consequent results since our qualitative results are not aﬀected.
22The ﬁrst part follows from Lemma 1, given that θ = 0 and αj = 1 for producers not already
in F 0
τ (see Figure 1(a).). The second part follows from the fact that ﬁrms that will move
will be those in M for whom rj(1 + vV )  αjrj(1)  rj(1).14 Then, Lemma 2 ensures
that ΔuV
n > 0. Intuitively, a move of an additional ﬁrm from MS to MF increases tax
revenue and improves production eﬃciency, which are social beneﬁts not fully taken into
account by private producers.
An implication of this proposition will be exploited in the following section. If the
government can inﬂuence the size of the informal sector, it would have no incentive to do
so in the trade tax regime if θ = 0. On the other hand, it might want to take measures to
increase the size of the formal sector in the VAT regime if they are not too costly. Given
that, it might be able to make uV higher than uT even though the trade tax regime would
be preferred in the absence of such measures if producers were free to choose their own
sector.
A further implication of this proposition is as follows. Suppose that condition (17) in
Corollary 3 is not satisﬁed when θ = 0, so when there is no informal sector, uT >u V .T h i s
would happen, for example, if trade taxes are very eﬀective at indirectly taxing proﬁts in
the formal sector. In these circumstances, Proposition 1 would imply that regardless of
the size of the informal sector, the trade tax regime would be preferred to the VAT regime.
Alternatively, suppose that (17) is satisﬁed, which implies that uV >u T when F = A.
The consequences of that can be seen if we consider the two cases, one where the size of
the formal sector is larger in the trade tax regime than in the VAT regime when producers
freely choose their sector, and the other where the opposite is the case. We continue to
assume that θ =0f o rt h et i m eb e i n g .
14 Formally, the proof that these inequalities apply assumes that the equilibrium Fv is stable. The
equilibrium value of Fv depends on v, while at the same time the optimal choice of v depends
on Fv. (Recall that we assume optimal taxes are calculated given the size of F.) With some
abuse of notation, let Fv(v) ≡{ j ∈ A|αjrj(1) >r j(1 + v)} be the size of the formal sector
given v, and let v(Fv) be optimal tax rates given the size of the formal sector Fv. Consider
some initial value of F  
v ⊃ F 0
v .G i v e nF  
v, optimal tax rates will be v(F  
v) ,w h i c hi nt u r nw i l l
lead to a size of the formal sector F   
v = Fv(v(F  
v)). Stability at F 0
v requires that F   
v ⊂ F  
v.
Then, S  ⊂ S  , so producers in S  do not have an incentive to participate in the formal sector.
That is, rj(1 + vV (F  ))  αjrj(1)  rj(1).
23Case 1: |F 0
t | > |F 0
v |
This case would apply if the number of ﬁrms for which αj > 1 is relatively large, the
extreme case being that αj > 1 for all ﬁrms. As we saw in Proposition 1, for a given size
of the informal sector, either regime can dominate. Naturally, the same ambiguity will
generally apply when the sizes of the sectors are endogenous. Nonetheless, endogeneity of
sector size may inﬂuence which sector is preferable. To illustrate the possibilities, suppose
we start at with the trade tax regime, where the size of the formal sector is |F 0
t |.I f w e
switch to the VAT regime, both the number and the composition of producers in the formal
sector will change if producers are free to choose their sector. Suppose we conceptually
decompose the change into two steps, the ﬁrst one a change in the composition of the
formal sector, holding the total number of producers ﬁxed, and the second a change in
the number of producers. The change in composition holding the number of producers in
the formal sector ﬁxed could cause utility to rise or fall. Then, given that |F 0
t | > |F 0
v |,
producers will reallocate from F to S and utility will fall by Proposition 2ii. The end
result may be higher or lower utility in the VAT regime.
Figure 2 illustrates the case where utility is ultimately lower in the VAT regime. Start
in the trade tax regime where the number of commodities produced in the formal sector is
given by |F 0
t | and household utility is uT. When the VAT is substituted for the trade tax
and the size of the informal sector is held constant at |F| = |F 0
t |, utility could rise as in
the ﬁgure to uV

. However, once the size of the formal sector is allowed to adjust, utility
under the VAT will fall as the size of the formal sector falls to F 0
v ,w h e r euV
o
<u T.O f
course, this is a purely heuristic argument since the composition of ﬁrms in the two sectors
will generally diﬀer between the two regimes, for any given size of the formal sector. But
it does illustrate that both the size and the composition of the informal sector inﬂuence
the ranking of the two regimes.
Case 2: |F 0
v | > |F 0
t |
Contrary to the previous case, here the number of ﬁrms for which αj > 1 is small, possibly
no ﬁrms. In this case, virtually anything can happen in moving from the trade tax to the
VAT regime. Although Proposition 2 indicates that uT will remain constant, uV is only
24assured to increase monotonically once |F 0
v | is reached. Whether trade taxes are preferred
to the VAT depends both on the relative size of uT and uV at |F 0
t |, but also on how the
latter changes when F expands from |F 0
t | to |F 0
v |.
Figure 3 illustrates one possibility. In this ﬁgure, utility under the trade tax at |F 0
t |,
uT, is higher than utility under the VAT for the same number of producers in the two
sectors (though a diﬀerent composition), denoted uV

. Suppose that uV r i s e sa sp r o d u c e r s
move to the formal sector because of the regime change. It is possible that, as in Figure 3,
utility can end up being higher in the VAT regime than in the trade tax regime (uV
o
>u T).
Of course, other outcomes might occur. The utility gain from the reallocation may not be
suﬃcient to cause the VAT regime to be preferred in this case.
Reallocations induced by a change in regime could alternatively reinforce the outcome
of a switch from the trade tax to the VAT regime. Thus, if uT >u V

in Case 2 where
|F 0
t | > |F 0
v |, the reduction in welfare from switching to the VAT will be exacerbated by the
induced reduction in the size of the formal sector. Similarly, in Case 1 where |F 0




>u T given the set of formal producers under the trade tax, F 0
t , the increase in the
size of the formal sector when the VAT is introduced improves the situation further.
The above discussion assumed that θ = 0. Matters become slightly more complicated
when θ>0, but similar outcomes can occur. Increasing θ above zero has the following
eﬀects. Since proﬁts are only taxed in the formal sector, the criterion for choosing the
formal sector becomes (1 − θ)RjF >R jS. The sizes of the formal sector in both regimes,
|F 0
t | and |F 0
v |, will thus fall, though their relative size remains ambiguous. In the trade
tax regime, by Lemma 1, uT will now rise if, starting at Ft, producers were to move from
sector S to F, as Figure 1(a) indicates. At the same time, as (19) shows, uV will increase
more in the VAT regime as more commodities are produced in sector F,s ot h ec u r v ei n
Figure 1(b) becomes steeper. As well, as S approaches zero, uV w o u l dr i s er e l a t i v et o
uT. As Corollary 3 indicates, there will be some value of θ  0 such that uV >u T when
S = ∅. Despite these changes, the qualitative comparisons made with θ = 0 still apply
when θ>0.
The upshot is that the comparison between VAT and trade tax regimes must take
account of changes in the size of the informal sector induced by the reform itself. In
25general, both the size and the composition of the two sectors will diﬀer between the two
regimes, and that makes the preferred outcome case-speciﬁc.
7 Tax Administration
In the previous section, we showed that the choice between the two tax regimes can be
inﬂuenced by the endogeneity of the size of the formal sector. Thus, for example, when
θ = 0, even though trade taxes may be preferred to the VAT for a given size of formal
sector, the ranking can be reversed once account is taken of the fact that producers can
choose their sectors endogenously. This can be the case if the chosen size of the formal
sector is higher under the VAT than under trade taxes. The reason is that per capita utility
is increasing in the size of the formal sector under the VAT but not under trade taxes.
(Alternatively, allowing producers to leave the formal sector when a VAT is instituted may
be the cause of the trade tax being preferred, as in the example of Figure 3.) Relying on
producers to move endogenously to the formal sector when a VAT is substituted for trade
taxes may not be suﬃcient to make the VAT regime preferable. Suppose that instead of
the size of the informal sector being determined solely by producers, the government can
also inﬂuence it by incurring a cost.15 This might serve as a mechanism for exploiting the
fact that utility under the VAT is increasing with the size of the formal sector. In this
section, we discuss some possible consequences of allowing the size of the formal sector to
be inﬂuenced by tax enforcement rather than relying solely on producer discretion.
Suppose for concreteness that proﬁts Rj are not the sole inﬂuence on the choice of
sector. In sector S, producers may face some expected cost associated with the chances that
they will be audited or investigated and prosecuted for tax evasion. Let the monetary value
of such costs for producer j by cS
j ,w h e r ecS
j is increasing in the intensity of tax enforcement
by the government. At the same time, producers in the formal sector may encounter
corrupt tax oﬃcials who demand bribes or extortionary payments in return for under-
15 This is analogous to the case studied by Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), where the government
has an additional policy instrument that aﬀects the number of commodities entering the tax
base. The optimal use of the instrument trades oﬀ its cost with the reduction in distortions
from having a broader tax base to achieve what they refer to as the optimal elasticity of taxable
income with respect to the tax rate.
26reporting or not over-reporting tax liabilities. Let cF
j be the monetary value of payments
to corrupt oﬃcials, where cF
j is decreasing in administrative eﬀort to reduce corruption.
The participation rate in the formal sector may then be written RFj− cF
j >R Sj − cS
j ,s o
more producers will join the formal sector the greater is administrative eﬀort. Increases
in administrative eﬀort will be costly and will therefore aﬀect the government budget
constraint, but we can assume for simplicity that neither cF
j nor cS
j directly aﬀect the
representative household’s budget. In the case of cF
j , the cost of bribery or extortion
simply redistributes money from the taxpayer to the oﬃcial, both of whom are included in
the representative household. The expected costs of prosecution for tax evasion, cS
j ,c a n
be considered non-pecuniary. Alternatively, it can be assumed that if they are monetary
sanctions, the proceed are returned as a lump sum to the household (to avoid giving the
government a purely revenue-raising incentive to improve enforcement).
With this kind of reasoning in mind, we can capture the eﬀect of improved tax admin-
istration in a very rough-and-ready way. Assume that the government can change the size
of the informal sector by incurring administrative costs that are convex in the change in
size of formal sector starting from F 0
v or F 0
t depending on the regime. Our approach is to
consider the value of changing the size of the formal sector in the two regimes when taxes
have been set optimally and producers are choosing their preferred sector. For simplicity,
we continue to assume that θ = 0 as in the previous section.
In the case of the trade tax regime, the choice of enforcement is straightforward. By
(18), or equivalently Lemma 1, starting with optimal trade taxes in place and producers
freely choosing their sector, ΔuT
n =0f o rn  ∈ F 0
t since αn = 1. Thus, the government
has no motive to expand F beyond F 0
t . To do so would simply waste resources without
improving consumer welfare. In the VAT regime, F should be increased if the beneﬁt from
inducing a producer to move from sector S to F exceeds the costs. The beneﬁt is given
by ΔuV
n in (19). The cost is given by the administrative cost incurred to increase the size
of the informal sector by increasing cS
j and decreasing cF
j .
Figure 4 illustrates how the option of varying the size of the formal sector by costly
enforcement may inﬂuence the choice of tax regime. The ﬁgure indicates a case where,
corresponding with that in Figure 2, uT >u V
o
when producers freely choose their sector
27and the government exerts no special administrative eﬀort, while uV >u T as F approaches
A. Enforcement induces the size of the formal sector to increase, which in the VAT regime
causes uV net of administrative costs, denoted uV , to increase as long as enforcement costs
are not too large. The ﬁgure shows an example where uV rises above uT, implying that
it may be optimal to adopt the VAT regime when administrative costs are not too high,
even though the trade tax regime is better in the absence of enforcement eﬀort.
This ﬁnding assumes that uV >u T as S approaches zero, which may not be the
case when θ = 0. This might suggest that accompanying administrative reform with more
eﬀective taxation of income in the formal sector may be needed to ensure that a move to
a VAT will be beneﬁcial. However, as we have seen, increasing θ i n d u c e sm o r ep r o d u c e r s
to stay in the informal sector, so that higher administrative costs are required to increase
t h es i z eo ft h ef o r m a ls e c t o rs u ﬃ c i e n t l yt om a k euV >u T.
This result assumes that administrative costs are not too high. One implication might
be that lowering such costs through the modernization of tax administration should be a
part of tax reform. Indeed, it might be a necessary requirement to justify adopting a VAT.
As Ebrill et al (2001) point out, the implementation of a VAT is typically accompanied
by an improvement in tax administration, for example, by modernizing the administrative
organization and instituting better information auditing and reporting. In our model, the
VAT regime gives the government an incentive to modernize its tax administration to lower
the cost of tax collection. In the trade tax regime, the costs of administration may remain
high since there is no incentive for improving tax administration.
8 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to use optimal commodity tax analysis to compare a
VAT-type commodity tax system with a system of trade taxes as means of raising revenues
in an economy with a non-negligible informal sector. The choice of an optimal commodity
tax approach has its advantages and disadvantages. It is somewhat restrictive in limiting
government policy instruments to indirect rather than direct taxes, but this may not be too
unrealistic in the context of developing countries for which the analysis is mainly relevant.
It is also somewhat restrictive in its focus on eﬃciency in the tax system to the exclusion
28of redistributive concerns. However, given that the emphasis in the literature on the choice
of a tax system for developing countries has been on eﬃciency, this is perhaps the most
suitable approach for sorting out the merits of VAT versus trade tax systems. The optimal
tax approach is ﬂexible enough to be able to consider commodity taxes and trade taxes in
their most eﬃcient forms, since we have allowed the government to diﬀerentiate tax rates
across commodities for both systems.
Each tax system has its advantages, and depending on the circumstances, one or the
other may be preferred on eﬃciency grounds. As we have emphasized, the main advantage
of the VAT regime is that it leads to production eﬃciency in the formal sector. As well,
it succeeds in taxing informal producers to the extent that they purchase inputs from the
formal sector. On the other hand, it does not tax sales by the informal sector or the pure
proﬁts of formal ﬁrms. The trade tax regime, while it distorts production eﬃciency, does
tax sales by both sectors (by assumption) and indirectly taxes the proﬁts of both sectors
as well, which is advantageous as long as there are limits to the direct taxation of proﬁts.
More generally, we have allowed the size of the informal sector to respond endogenously
to the tax system. As it turns out, both tax systems have an inﬂuence on the size of the
informal sector, although the relative magnitude and eﬃciency of that eﬀect is ambiguous.
With trade taxes, ﬁrms will choose between sectors based on their relative productivity in
each sector (assuming proﬁts taxes are not important). Under the VAT, some ﬁrms might
come to the formal sector even though they have no productive advantage from doing so,
and in the end endogeneity of the choice of sector by producers might itself inﬂuence which
tax system is preferred.
In developing countries, weak tax administration and enforcement are often cited as
major obstacles to adopting a VAT, given that the latter requires more information and
special skills to administer eﬀectively. This is reﬂected in the fact that previous analyses
of the choice of tax regime have typically taken as given the size of the informal sector.
An important aspect of our analysis is not only to let the size of the informal sector diﬀer
between tax regimes, but also to consider the eﬀect of allowing the government to devote
resources to tax administration. In our model, the government may be more motivated to
enhance tax enforcement under a VAT regime than with trade taxes. Moreover, the ability
29to aﬀect the size of the informal sector may be a determinant of the preferred regime. This
serves to emphasize the fact that it is necessary to consider reform of the tax system and
reform of the tax administration as going hand in hand.
Some of the other assumptions we have made are also quite strong. Most importantly,
we have modeled evasion in a very simple way, following the related underlying literature.
We have assumed, for example, that there can be no evasion of trade taxes by informal
ﬁrms, although they can evade the VAT on their sales. This facilitates our optimal policy
analysis. Perhaps more important, we have ignored the possibility that ﬁrms in the formal
sector might also evade some taxes by, for example, failing to report all their sales to the
tax authority while claiming input tax credits. A more complete analysis would include
a detailed speciﬁcation of tax evasion as a risky decision with ﬁrms subject to the pos-
sibility of detection and penalty, and perhaps even facing corruption or extortion by tax
administrators. We have also ignored any diﬀerences in the costs of administering the two
systems, including costs borne by taxpaying ﬁrms themselves. It is not clear how a more
complicated tax administration system would inﬂuence the choice between trade taxes and
the VAT.
We have assumed that all commodities are taxable, which simpliﬁes the analysis con-
siderably. Moreover, we have assumed that informal producers are like formal producers,
except perhaps less productive. In practice, informal producers tend to be small, and typi-
cally operate at the retail level selling mainly to ﬁnal consumers rather than ﬁrms. Indeed,
may ﬁrms in the formal sector may well fall below the threshold value of sales to qualify
as VAT-registered ﬁrms. The distinction between informal ﬁrms and those legitimately
below the threshold size is moot since our analysis applies to both.
We have also taken the rate of tax on proﬁts to be given and less than 100 percent.
This is important because as Proposition 3 indicates, higher proﬁt tax rates tend to favor
the VAT regime. A more general analysis would include the reform of both indirect taxes
(VAT and trade taxes) and direct taxes (proﬁt and income taxes). Such a coordinated
approach would have implications not just for the choice of tax regime, but also for the
optimal allocation of resources devoted to improving tax administration.
Finally, our approach has been to analyze optimal policies separately for trade taxes
30and the VAT, and to do a global comparison between them. This approach is suitable as
a means of determining the main factors that work in favor of one regime or the other. It
would be useful to allow the government to select a mix of commodity and trade taxes,
since presumably on optimal policy grounds that would improve eﬃciency. Each tax could
then be directed at transactions for which it was best suited. (See Munk (2005) for an
analysis of the optimal mix of commodity taxes and tariﬀs with administrative costs.)
Presumably a disadvantage of that approach in practice is that two tax systems operating
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Figure 2. VAT vs. Trade Taxes when |F 0
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Figure 3. VAT vs. Trade Taxes when |F 0
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Figure 4. Eﬀect of Tax Administration Eﬀort
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Proof of Proposition 1
















pj − (1 − θ)RF = G (A.1)
Substituting (A.1) into (8) yields:

















(Rpj − Eqj) − λG (A.2)
Denote by superscript C outcomes in the constrained trade tax regime where tj =0f o r
j ∈ XS. The optimized value of Lagrangian for this constrained case is LC
t and may be
written as follows:
LC
t = uC +( λC − μC)















qj) − λCG (A.3)
where superscript C indicates that all variables and Lagrange multipliers are being valued
at the constrained trade tax optimum. Since the constraints in (A.3) are binding at the
optimum, we have that LC
t = uC. Then, without changing the value of the Lagrangian,
we can replace the Lagrange multipliers by those evaluated at the optimum of the VAT
regime, λV and μV ,s ot h a t :
LC
t = uC = uC +( λV − μV )















qj) − λV G
Letting ΔuT = uT − uC,w ec a nm a k eu s eo ft h i se x p r e s s i o nt ow r i t euT as:
uT = uC + ΔuT = uC +( λV − μV )















qj) − λV G + ΔuT
Suppose now that the VAT rates v are set equal to the restricted trade tax rates tC.
Switching to the VAT regime changes the rent and net output in the formal sector by
RFV − RFC and RFV
pj − RFC
pj , respectively. Recall that RFV and RFV
pj are evaluated at
world prices in the VAT regime. Then, denoting by LC
v the value of the Lagrange function
in the VAT regime with v = tC, λ = λV and μ = μV ,
uT = LC




pj − (1 − θ)RFC − θRFV
 































+( λV − μV )(1 − θ)(RFV − RFC)+ΔuT  uV = LV
v
where in the second equality, we use RFV =
 
j RFV
pj . Proposition 1 follows immediately.
I nt h ec a s eo fF = ∅, the rent and net output in the formal sector vanish, and LC
v = LV
v
since v = tC in the optimum, i.e., the VAT is equivalent to import taxes. Then, Corollary
4 follows.
40